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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
LEHI IRRIGATIO·N CO~IP ANY, 
Plai~ntiff and ~4ppellatnt, 
YS. 
CIJ...-\_RENCE T. J~ONES and ED. H. WAIT-
SOX, State Engineer of the State of 
Utah, 
DBfendant and Resplondents. 
Case No. 
7189 
REPLY OF STATE ENGINEER TO BRIEF OF 
AMICUS CURIAE 
EDWARD W. CLYDE, 
Specml Ass'~t. Atborney General 
Until the brief of the Amicus Curiae was filed the 
State Engineer took no part in the court proceedings 
had herein. He neither participated in the submission of 
the facts nor in writing of the brief on appeal. This 
failure of the State Engineer to participate actively in the 
court proceedings was prompted by the fact that it ap-
peared by the pleadings simply to be a private dispute 
betw·een two water users over the right to use waters 
then running to waste. 
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4 
The Provo River Water Users Association has pre-
sented issues of much public importance in the future 
development of water law in this state. ·The State En-
gineer thinks that it would be unfortunate if the issues 
raised by the Amicus Curiae were to he decided upon 
their merits here. Many of the parties who ultin1ately will 
he affected by such a decision are not before the 
court and their views in the n1atter have never 
been pres-ented. Many of the facts essential to the de-
tern1ination of the questions here presented are not be-
fore the court. The Amicus Curiae simply seeks to have 
this court lay down a rule of law which underrules of 
stare decisis will control this issue when it is finally prr-
sented by the real parties in interest upon all the ma-
terial facts. It is not necessary for the Supreme Court 
to make such a determination in the instant case and we 
assert that the court should not do so. 
ROLE OF THE COURTS IN REVIEWING THE DE-
CISION OF THE STATE ENGINEER 
We,- at the outset, ask the court to cast itself in the 
role of the State Engineer confronted with the problem 
of determining the issues of this case. We ask the court 
to do this because it has already said, on more than one 
occasion, that on review from the decision of the State 
Engineer the issues before the court are no broader than 
were the issues presented to the State Engineer. See for 
example Eardley v. Terry, 94 Utah 367, 77 P. 2d 362, 
wherein the Supreme Court expressly stated that on re-
view of the decision of the State Engineer the district 
court, which hears the matter de novo, can do no more 
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5 
than the State Engineer; and that on appeal to the Su-
preine Court the issues are limited to those which con-
fronted the State Engineer in the approval or rejection 
of an application. 
ln reYie\\Ting the State :BJngineer 's decision therefore, 
this court should nsstn-ne the role of the State Engineer. 
rr'he Suprerne Court has time and again told the State En-
gineer that he has no judicial power and that he must not 
attempt to decide judicial questions or determine vested 
rights except in a very general way. See Little Cotton-
'vood Y. I.Cimball, 76 Utah 243, 289 P. 116; Eardley v. 
Terry, supra; Whitmore v. Murray City, 107 Utah 445, 
154 P. 2d 748. 
The action of the State Engineer in approving an 
application is therefore not a judicial procedure. The 
State Engineer must not attempt to adjudicate vested 
rights. His problem is simply one of determining whether 
or not, under the rules laid down by the Supreme Court 
and the provisions of Section 100-3-8; U.C.A. 19'43, the 
application should be approved. In approving the appli-
cation the State Engineer need not- find affirmatively 
that there is unappropriated water in the named source. 
It is sufficient that he determine that there is a reason-
able probability that the application can be perfected. 
New applications should he favored, not hindered; 
reasonable doubt as to whether the application should be 
approved or rejected should he resolved in favor of ap-
proval. It is only w~ere there is no ;probability that the 
application might be perfected that the State Engineer 
should deny the application. Such was the holding of the 
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6 
court in Rocky Ford Irr·iga~t'ion Co. v. Klents Lake R·es. 
Co., 104 Utah 202, 13'5 P. 2d 108. This has been the con-
sistant holding of this court. See Little Cottowwood v. 
Ki.mb~all, supra; Ea.rdley v. Terry, supra. In the Rocky 
Ford case the Supreme Court said that an application to 
appropriate rnust be approved, unless it "clearly" ap-
pears that there is no water available. Cases of doubt 
must always be resolved in favor of approval. ·Thus the 
court, acting in the role of the State Engineer, should 
not reject an application unless it clearly appears that 
there is no unappropriated water available. 
The reason why the court has uniformally held that 
doubts should be resolved in favor of the application is 
that the approval of an application could not possibly 
affect vested rights. Statements to this effect have run 
through the court opinions for the past forty-five years. 
In Yates v. N,ewton, 59 Utah 105, 202 P. 208, the court 
said that no order of the State Engineer can disturh 
vested rights in water. In Eardley v. Terry, supra, the 
court said that no final rights are acquired until proof 
of appropriation, required by Section 100-'3-16, is made 
and a certificate of appTopriation has been issued. In 
S·owards v. Me1agher, 37 Utah 212, 108 P. 1112, the court 
held that the application to appropriate was nothing 
more than a preliminary notice of intent. The State En-
gineer should examine the application to ascertain the 
declared intent and, if there is any reasonable probability 
to believe that a right might be perfected, the State En-
gineer has been told by this court that he should approve 
the application. 
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SHOULD THE APPLIC·ATION HA 'TE BEEN 
A;PPRO\rED ~ 
It is argued by the Amicus Curiae that there is no 
unappropriated \Yater; that this record shows, "vithout 
any shado\Y of a doubt, that the \Vaters in question are 
O\Yned by the Provo R.iyer Water Users Association. The 
proble1n presented is not simple nor· is the answer so 
clear. In the fir~t place all Provo River Water Users As-
sociation has ~n application to appropriate water. An 
application to appropriate is not an appropriation. It is 
but a preliminary notice of intention. There is no appro-
priation of the water until certificate of appropriation is-
~ues. Therefore, so long as there are only applications on 
a stream all of the waters thereof are unappropriated and 
new applications ought not to he rejected. It is not an-
ticipated that this principle of law will he seriously con-
troverted. The Utah court has, time and again, said that 
an application to appropriate is not a completed appro-
priation. See Sow,ards. v. MBagher, supra; RobmS'on v. 
Schoenfeld, 62 Utah 233, 218 P. 1041; Deseret Livestock 
Company v. H 1oopiania, 66 Utah 25, 239 P. 47·9; Litt~e 
Cottonw:o1od Water Co. v. Kimball, supra; Duche.sne 
Couwt:y v. Humphreys, 106 Utah 332, 148 P. 2d 3·38. 
·Thus if we assume a given stream yielding 10 c.f.s. 
upon which applications to appropriate totalling 40 c.f.s. 
have been filed, we still cannot conclude that all of the 
water in the stream has been appropriated. In fact none 
of it has. It is not until the water is put to beneficial use 
and a certificate of appropriation has issued that the 
court or the State Engineer can conclude that an appro-
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priation has been made. So long as an application is 
pending there are numerous places wher·e, because of, 
delays, the priority date of the application may lapse, 
thus validating a junior filing. Likewise an applicant 
1nay file for G c.f.s. but when it comes to making proof 
of appropriation he may only show that 1 c.f.s. has been 
used. These reasons, among others, have prompted the 
court consistently to hold that the application, even 
though in good standing, is not an appropriation. There-
fore public waters which are covered only by approved 
filings cannot be considered to be appropriated. New 
filings should be accepted until such time as proof is 
submitted. It is therefore respectfully submitted that this 
record clearly shows, even if the facts brought into the 
record by the brief of the Amicus Curiae are assumed to 
he true, that the waters in question are still unappro-
priated in that nothing has been done to appropriate 
them except the filing of an application. Since that appli-
cation may lapse, or since proof may not be submitted, 
the law does not permit the State Engineer to reject new 
applications on the same water. Such new applications 
ought not to be rejected until the water has been aetually 
appropriated and a certificate of approp·riation has is-
sued. 
W ATER.S RUNNING TO WASTE ARE UNAPRO-
PRIATED WATERS 
There is another factor which indicates that the 
waters in question are unappropriated. The Supreme 
Court said in the case of F'alkenbierg v. Neff, 72 Utah 
258, 2'69 P. 1008, that where the plaintiff and defendant 
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both held approved applications and the defendant's wa.s 
prior in time, the defendant had no right to complain of 
the diversion of "~ater by the plaintiff if the defendant 
"~as not then in a. position to use the water beneficially. 
That at such ti.nre~ as a pri.or appropriator is not usitn.g 
the u·a.ter for a beneficial punpose such wtaters .a'fie con,.. 
sidered a.nd treat~ed as urna,pp,opriated public ·wi(J)tl0rs arnd 
for such peri.od of t,in~e are subject to ·ap~p~ropr~at~on a;nd 
use by .others. 
To the same effect see Aaams v. Port~age Irr. Res. 
& Potcer Co., 95 Utah 1, 72 P. 2d 648. The court there said 
that though the flow of water may be within the quantum 
of water to the use of which an appropriator has a pr,e-
ferential right, during any time it is not being used 
beneficially and economically it still is, remains or be-
comes publici ju.ris subject to all common rights of the 
public to appropriate and use. 'There are other cases in 
the Utah reports to like effect. No one can hold a right 
to waste water. At such times as he is not, by virtue of 
a prior appr9priation, using the water he cannot com-
plain at use of the water by others. Water running to 
waste is for the moment public water, subject to ap.pro-
priation and use. 
This case was presented to the State Engineer as a 
private dispute between an irrigation company and a 
landowner, on whose land waters arise by seepage. Each 
claimed a superior right to use the water. At the time of 
the dispute the waters were running to waste. The State 
Engineer, by approving the application, simply intended 
to settle the immediate dispute between those two users 
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and to recognize in Jones a superior right of use because 
he had filed on it and Lehi Irrigation Company had not. 
'rhe approval order was expressly made ''subject to prior 
rights.'' Certainly under the cases cited next above there 
was a sufficient showing to justify the approval of the ap-
plication. Whether or not the Provo River Water Users 
Association can later reassert the right to capture this 
water is entirely foreign to this law suit. The water was 
unappropriated because (1) no one had perfected an ap-
propriation on it (there were only applications which 
had not yet ripened into appropriations) and (2) the 
waters were running to waste and the Supreme Court 
has said that when the waters are running to waste they 
become publici j111ris and others may appropriate and use 
them, subject to prior rights. 
I 
Under such a state of the facts the State Engineer 
was required to approve the app~lication. There was, 
under the adjudicated cases, an affirmative showing that 
the waters in question were unappropriated. But certain-
ly one can say that there is a reasonable basis for be-
lieving that a right of use might be perfected. 
WATERS WHICH HAVE E·SCAPED ARE PUBLIC 
WAT'ERS 
There is much in the Utah cases to indicate that 
once water escapes from the lands of an original appro-
priator he may not follow tha.t water into or upon the 
lands of another and there recapture it. There are also 
holdings to the effect that once water returns to a natur-
al channel or source, and there commingles with other 
waters, the right of the original appropriator is lost; that 
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the \Yater becon1es public \vater subject again to appro-
priation. The rases to follow are not cited for the pur-
pose of asking the court to rule against the Provo l~iver 
''rater Users A.\.ssociation on the merits. They are merely 
cited to demonstrate that the State Engineer was con-
fronted \Yith a situation in which he could legally believe 
that there \vas a reasonable basis for believing that a 
right mig·ht be perfected. See for example OZark v. North 
Cottonzcood /.rr. & Water Co., 79 Utah 425, 11 P. 2.d 300. 
This was a suit to quiet title to the waters of North ~Cot­
tonwood Creek. The plaintiff sought to establish a right 
to waters that had seeped back to the main channel after 
having been used by the plaintiff for irrigation. The 
court said that it is quite generally held that one may not 
acquire a perfected right to have seep,age water kept up, 
but when seepage water finds its way back to the natural 
~tream from which it originally came such water may be 
appropriated and again diverted and used upon other 
lands. All of the parties to this litigation, the court said, 
procee\ded well they might upon the theory that the seep-
age water in controversy was subject to appropriation. 
The facts clearly showed that the seepage water in ques-
tion drained from irrigation hack into the natural chan-
nel and again became a part of the natural stream. 
In the instant case it is clear that the waters in ques-
tion did escape the control of the original appropriator. 
They had manifest themselves in the form of springs 
and seeps on the lands of Jones ; they had returned to 
a natural source of supply and the North Cottonwood 
case states that they became open to appropriation. 
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The State Engineer believes that the court must yet 
straighten out the law in regard to the right of a party to 
follow or recapture seepage water. It appears to us that 
in this regard the law is in a state of flux; that whether 
or not the Provo River Water Users Association is going 
to be able to follow this water through the lands of others 
and into Utah Lake is an important legal question. There 
is much in the Utah cases to suggest that this water has 
become public water because it has escaped. Whether the 
la vv finally becomes settled along those lines or not there 
certainly now is a reasonable doubt as to whether or not 
this applicant can perfect an application. There are at 
least three theories upon which he might eventually pre-
vail. ( 1) That the water is not appropriated because there 
is no perfected ·appropriation covering it, ( qnly applica-
tions) ; ( 2) that the water was at the time going to waste 
and that water while wasting is public water open to ap-
propriation, and (3) waters which have escaped from the 
control of the original appropriator and found their way 
back into a natural source of supply again becomes public 
\Vater, open to appropriation; that the right to recapture 
and reuse water requires that you keep the water under 
control and in your possession and that if it escapes, 
then, like the wind and the sunshine and the air, it he-
comes free by nature and public in character. At least 
it must be said at this point that there is a reasonable 
basis for believing that this applicant can perfect a filing. 
THERE ARE O·THER P AR.TIES WHO 
SHO:ULD BE BEFORE THE CO·URT AND 
OTHER FACTS THAT THE CO'URT ·sH:OULD 
HA \TE AT ITS DISPOS-AJ.J BEFO·RE RULING 
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OX THE QUESTI()N OF O'VNERSIIII> OF 
THIS '\7 ATER BY I>R()\,.() RESER\T()lR CO~I-
P~-\.XY. 
Sinee the State Engineer has no judicial powers, and 
since he 1nust not, in passing on an application to a:ppro-
priate "Tater atteinpt to adjudicate existing rights, both 
the State Engineer and the court should inquire into 
those matters in only a very general way. L~t!tle C\o,tton-
zc;ood llr a.ter Co. v. Kimball, supra. There are water users 
\Vho contend that Utah Lake is, in effect, their private 
reservoir; that they own the storage capacity of Utah 
Lake up to a point known as Compromise point and that 
above that level there is no right to inundate farm lands. 
Those parties have argued in the past that the Bureau 
of R.eclamation and the Provo River Waters Users Asso-
ciation can not retain title to see-page waters after they 
escape into Utah Lake and they have indicated that they 
will oppose any attempt to perfect such a scheme for re-
capturing and reusing this water. Those parties are not 
no\v before the court and this court ought not to make 
a ruling now which, under principles of sta.re decisis, 
would control future litigation on this point. Neither 
Jones nor Lehi Irrigation Company are too much con-
cerned over that point. 
Furthermore, there has, from the first, been some 
question in the mind of the State El}gineer and his staff 
as to whether anyone can store water in Utah Lake and 
claim that the water was being beneficially used. The 
area of the lake is so large and the water so shallow that 
there are tremendous evaporation losses. So much s·o 
that the time may well come when this court will .hold 
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14 
that it is not a beneficial use to store water in such a 
wasteful reservoir. 
The waters of the entire area are covered by a gen-
eral adjudication suit pending before the ·State Engineer. 
One day the p~roblems which the Amicus Curiae seeks to 
raise will be squarely presented to the court by parties 
who are directly concerned. For the time being this is 
a private law suit between two small water users, each 
of whom claims the right to use waters which are running 
to waste, and which have escaped from the control of the 
original appropriator. The vested rights of Provo River 
Water Users Association will not he adversely affected. 
Their only complaint is that at some future date they 
may be required to litigate this matter with Jones to re-
capture the water and that Jones might make a nuisance 
of himself in interfering with their flow. 'This court has 
always told the State Engineer that the mere fact that 
a man is given the "fighting'' right high on a stream is 
no justification for refusing his application. See Rocky 
Ford Irr. ·Co. v. Kents Lake, supra. 
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SUl\~l~IARY 
The Supren1e Court has told the State Engineer that 
he has no judicial po,Yers; that he must not, in ruling on 
an application, attempt to adjudicate or deter1nine vested 
rights. On the question of vested rights the State En-
gineer is to make only a very general inquiry. If, after 
such an inquiry, he has any reasonable basis for believ-
ing that a right might be perfected, he is to resolve such 
doubts in favor of approvaL The Supreme Court has 
also said that an application to appropriate water is not 
an appropriation and that waters covered only by an 
application are still not appropriated. The court has also 
said that waters running to waste are for the time being 
public waters open to appropriation, and that waters 
which have escaped from the control of the original ap-
propriator and returned to the natural source of supply 
again become public waters. All three of the above are 
present in the instant case and combined they certainly 
suggest a reasonable doubt as to whether or not all of 
the waters are appropriated. Therefore, the application 
should have been approved. The other issues as to owner-
ship raised by the Amicus Curiae simply ask this co~rt 
to do what it has already told the State Engineer he must 
not do, to-wit: make an adjudication of vested rights. 
Respectfully submitted, 
G ROIVE·R A. G ILE·S 
Attorney General 
E·DWARD W. CLY·DE, 
SpeciJal Ass~~- Attorney General 
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